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Abstract
From 1961 onwards, Germany acquired 916 Lockheed F-104 Starfighters, of which 292 aircraft crashed and 116 pilots lost their lives.
The purpose of this research project was to find out why these aircraft crashed and whether the Starfighters crashed for reasons different
from those for other military aircraft in Germany. Seventy-one German F-104 accidents between 1978 and 1986 were analyzed by
reviewing the original accident files. A Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) Level-1 analysis was used as
methodology. It was found that more than 50% of the reviewed German F-104 accidents occurred due to technology and/or physical
environment. More than half of the sample’s accidents were engine related. It was concluded that the F-104 was indeed more accident-
prone than other co-era types. Moreover, the J-79 engine was found to be a weak link in the F-104’s safety record, and the Starfighter’s
unforgiving handling characteristics induced an elevated level of skill-based errors.
Keywords: F-104, Starfighter, HFACS, human factors
Introduction
In the late 1950s the German Ministry of Defense (MOD) was looking for a new combat aircraft to replace its aging fleet
of Air Force and Navy fighters. Lockheed’s F-104 Starfighter won the international competition in October 1958 after a
prolonged selection process (Siano, 2016). This futuristic fighter was able to cruise at Mach 2 speeds, was packed full with
latest electronics, and promised an unparalleled combat performance. Hence, the German MOD had high expectations for
this brand new jet fighter.
However, these expectations quickly turned into a nightmare. Following its introduction into service in May 1960 an
accident series developed, which rocked Germany’s military, Germany’s parliament, and Germany’s public (Neu, 2004;
Siano, 2016). The accident series peaked between February 1965 and July 1966, when on average once every two weeks an
F-104 was lost. In this time frame 46 F-104 fighters crashed, killing 29 pilots. Even today this period is still infamously
called Germany’s ‘‘Starfighter Krise’’ [Starfighter crisis].
Although the crisis was eventually overcome and accident rates settled at or even below international rates, the accident
numbers still grew at a stunning pace. By December 1968 the first 100 F-104s were lost; the 200th aircraft crashed in
September 1975 and the last German F-104 crashed as late as 1989, while already out of operational service (Fischbach,
http://dx.doi.org/10.7771/2159-6670.1218
1998; Kropf, 2002). Despite being retired, sold, or scrapped
more than 25 years ago, this 1950s jet aircraft to this date is
still overshadowed by myths: in contrast to common press
and public referrals as ‘‘widowmaker’’ or ‘‘flying coffin’’
and being perceived as a notoriously pilot-killing aircraft,
its former pilots still hold it in highest esteem (Neu, 2004;
Reis, 2012; Vogler, 1986). Nevertheless, of a total of 916
aircraft acquired by the German military 292 crashed or
were damaged beyond repair during the F104’s time in
service from 1960 to 1991. This came at the cost of 116
dead pilots, including eight U.S. Air Force (USAF)
exchange pilots (Fischbach, 1998; Kropf, 2002). Hence,
the purpose of this project is to find out whether the former
myth should be rejected, which lopsidedly blames the
aircraft’s technology, and which is challenged by con-
temporary findings on human error.
For almost three decades Germany’s military, parlia-
ment, press, and public have frequently and repeatedly
been affected by the Starfighter—obviously to varying
degrees, but definitely unlike by any other piece of
military equipment before or after (Neu, 2004). At the
time of writing, searching the term ‘‘F-104 widow-
maker’’ at Google leads to more than 150,000 results,
which indicates a surprisingly strong echo from an era
that ended almost three decades ago. Yet, surprisingly
little scientific literature has been published on the
Starfighter and a considerable gap in research exists
on the Starfighter’s accident causations. Although the
F-104’s flight safety issues were repeatedly addressed by
the German parliament’s defense committee, no scien-
tific analysis of its accident causations exists, whatso-
ever. Consequently, no contemporary method of accident
analysis and classification has ever been applied to the
F-104 accidents either.
Broadly speaking, two very simplistic, contradicting,
and extreme views on the F-104 prevail in publications
(Reis, 2012). On the one hand, the myth of a poorly
designed pilot-killing monster, as the press tended to report
(Ein schöner Tod, 1982; Kauf von Schrott, 1969; Neu,
2004). And on the other hand, the sentimental pilot myth
of a high-performing, flawless, but unforgiving beauty
(Loy, 2011; Stiller, 1981; Vogler, 1986).
Research indicates that between 70% and 80% of
aviation accidents can be attributed to human error
(Dekker, 2002; Helmreich & Foushee, 2010; Shappell &
Wiegmann, 2001). Moreover, research on accident causa-
tion also questions the simplistic explanations common in
past decades (e.g., ‘‘pilot error’’) and suggests comprehen-
sive system-analysis approaches instead (Reason, 2000;
Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000). Hence, both prevailing
views on the F-104 are in conflict with latest research on
accident causations.
Consequently, the specific research question for this
project was whether the German F-104s crashed for
different reasons from those for other military aircraft.
To answer this question, the last 71 German F-104
accidents, which occurred between 1978 and 1986, will
first be analyzed, using the Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System (HFACS) as a method. An organiza-
tional and managerial analysis of Germany’s Air Force and
Navy is beyond the scope of this paper; hence, the HFACS
analysis is limited to its first level (unsafe acts).
The results of this analysis are expected to shed light on
the exact causes of these German F-104 accidents and
particularly on the relationship between human factor-
caused accidents and technology-caused accidents.
Next, the HFACS results will be quantitatively compared
with HFACS results of 72 USAF accidents. Due to a lack
of sources on earlier decades’ HFACS-coded USAF acci-
dents, the time span from 1991 to 1997 had to be used as
reference. This comparison will show whether the German
F-104 accident causes differ significantly from accidents in
U.S. military aviation. Additionally, the German F-104
accident rates and engine-caused accident rates will be
compared with co-era USAF aircraft, such as the F-105
or F-106.
Only if the aircraft’s advanced technology, labeled
unmanageable by press and public, has caused significantly
more accidents than what can be considered the norm
would the ‘‘widowmaker’’ and ‘‘pilot-killer’’ myth be
justified. For this reason this research project attempts to
find out whether the F-104 crashed for technological and
human factor causes different from those for aircraft in the
U.S. Air Force.
This analysis is restricted to the last nine years of
operational service in Germany’s Air Force and Navy
(1978 to 1986). The F-104 attained its bad reputation in the
‘‘Starfighter crisis’’ of 1965–1966, which would thus be an
obvious choice for an F-104 HFACS analysis. But for
meaningful results, a suitable control group would have to
be an HFACS analysis of a similar aircraft (i.e., single-seat,
single-engine supersonic fighter) from the same era,
operated in the same environment (i.e., European weather,
low-level flying)—and such an analysis simply does not
exist; nor are the accident files of possible control groups
(e.g. Danish F-100, Dutch or Canadian F-104 accidents in
Europe) publicly accessible, which prevents the creation of
an own data set. Hence, the available control group in terms
of time span and volume (HFACS analysis of USAF
accidents from 1991 to 1997) defined which German F-104
accidents had to be analyzed to achieve meaningful results
(i.e., 1978 to 1986).
As mentioned before, an organizational and managerial
analysis of Germany’s Air Force and Navy is beyond the
scope of this paper. Hence, the HFACS analysis is limited
to its first level (unsafe acts). However, the second level
(Preconditions for Unsafe Acts—Environmental Factors—
Technological Environment and Physical Environment)
will still be addressed in the results and discussion sections
of this paper.
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Shappell and Wiegmann (2004) have published an
HFACS analysis of U.S. military aviation accidents, in
which 72 USAF accidents in the time span of 1991 to 1997
have been analyzed. The preconditions for a perfect control
group have been described above, but such a control group
is simply not available. The available USAF control group
has a similar volume and time span, but includes different
types of aircraft operated in a different environment.
The exact percentage of the control group’s data (see
Tables 3 and 6) can only be estimated to within 2% of its
true value. Unfortunately, contact with the authors of the
mentioned paper could not be established. Hence, clarifica-
tion could not be achieved.
The test group’s HFACS coding was performed by a
single person only. The coding and its reliability will be
described in the Methodology section (subsections ‘‘HFACS
Coding’’ and ‘‘Reliability’’). Nevertheless, despite these
limitations the results of this research are expected to be
meaningful.
Literature Review
By 1955, only ten years after Germany’s thorough defeat
in World War II, the young Federal Republic of Germany
was permitted to rebuild its armed forces. Germany had to
do its part in a crucial effort for the common defense of
Western Europe against the threat posed by the Soviet
Union and the Warsaw Pact (Rebhan, 2006; Wettig, 1995).
However, Germany’s military had to be rebuilt from
scratch. The initial equipment procured by its military was
mostly legacy and excess equipment from the United
States, Canada, Great Britain, and even France. The initial
outfit for the Air Force consisted of various types of trainer
and cargo aircraft, while the combat units were equipped
with F-84 and F-86 jets in different variants (Lemke, 2006;
Rebhan, 2006). As the Korean War had shown, both types
were already at the brink of obsolescence and the search for
a successor started as early as 1956 (Lemke, 2006; Siano,
2016).
For the acquisition of a new fighter several factors
had to be taken into consideration: (a) military require-
ments; (b) political requirements, and (c) industry require-
ments (Lemke, 2006; Schlieper, 1995; Siano, 2016).
Initially, eleven fighter types in different stages of their
development were being considered. Finally, the selection
was narrowed down to three types: Grumman’s F-11 Super
Tiger, Dassault’s Mirage III A, and Lockheed’s F-104
(Siano, 2016).
The expected air threat in a future conflict with the
Warsaw Pact was high-flying nuclear bombers like the
TU-16 Badger, M-4 Bison, or TU-95 Bear, escorted by
supersonic fighters such as the MiG-19 Farmer or the MiG-
21 Fishbed. Simultaneously, smaller bombers like the Yak-
25 or IL-28 might be attacking at lower altitudes. Not only
were suitable surface-to-air missiles not yet available, but
to make things worse Germany only had an east–west
extension of 300 to 400 km. All this meant extremely short
reaction times for North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) defenders in the case of a surprise assault by
Warsaw Pact forces. Hence, there was an evident need for a
fighter with an unsurpassed climb rate, and a need for
extremely high cruise speeds (Lemke, 2006; Schlieper,
1995).
Additionally, NATO’s defense strategy at the time was
MC 14/2 which aimed at maintaining peace by deterring
Warsaw Pact aggression with the threat of massive nuclear
retaliation (NATO, 1957). Hence, the German MOD consi-
dered its means as part of a credible deterrence would be a
fighter capable of delivering nuclear ordnance (Siano, 2016).
Lastly, and mostly for financial reasons the German
MOD was looking for a single multi-role fighter type
instead of several different platforms. This multi-role
fighter was supposed to equip the German Air Force as
well as the Navy. It was supposed to be a pure air-to-air
fighter, a reconnaissance platform, as well as a nuclear and
conventional bomber—all in one airframe and without any
reconfiguration to fulfill each role (Siano, 2016).
Two diametrically opposed political interests had to be
recognized in the selection process. The first political
interest involved France: after two world wars Germany
now intended to tie the bonds to neighboring France by
acquiring the new Mirage III jet. However, France refused
to sell nuclear weapons to Germany. The second political
interest involved the United States, which was the largest
power in the Western Alliance—the United States had
agreed reluctantly to the integration of nuclear weapons
into a future German fighter. But the deal would only be
closed under the condition that a U.S. product was bought,
and under the condition of U.S. control over these weapons
(Lemke, 2006; Siano, 2016).
At the end of World War II Germany possessed one of
the largest and strongest aviation industries worldwide. But
after the lost war a forced break of ten years was induced in
which the industry was dismantled and specialists had to
change their career paths to survive. In the meantime
anything related to aviation and air war (e.g., airframes,
engines, avionics, weapons, etc.) had seen unprecedented
leaps forward. When the German aviation industry finally
regained permission to design and build aircraft in 1955, it
lacked knowledge and excellence in all sectors.
Both the German aviation industry and the German
MOD intended to rebuild a modern and competitive
German aviation industry. Therefore, both were looking
for a comprehensive knowledge and technology transfer of
a cutting-edge fighter design. This technology transfer
should also include the establishment of a domestic fighter
production line. Such a comprehensive and permissive
contract was only offered by the Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation for its F-104 fighter (Lemke, 2006; Siano,
2016).
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In October 1958 the German MOD publicly announced
that it would procure Lockheed’s F-104G Starfighter. The
G-version (‘‘G’’ for Germany) was a further development
of the existing F-104, specially tailored to meet Germany’s
requirements (Bowman, 2000; Kropf, 2002; Siano, 2016).
Lockheed’s F-104 fighter made its maiden flight in April
1954. Unlike most fighter designs, this particular one did
not originate from a military requirement but was a private
venture of the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. Lockheed’s
design chief had visited USAF fighter pilots during the
Korean War, the latter being under the impression of
encounters with the Soviet-built MiG-15. Asked for their
demands for a new fighter design the most common replies
were ‘‘superior speed’’ and ‘‘superior climb-rate.’’ Upon the
design chief’s return to the United States, Lockheed’s
engineering team drafted a fighter to meet those demands.
The result was the F-104 (Bowman, 2000; Kropf, 2002).
The new design set multiple world records for speed and
altitude, but to Lockheed’s disappointment, the USAF only
showed limited interest in the type (F-104, 1958).
The F-104’s performance data and design features are
impressive even by today’s standards—let alone for a
design of the 1950s. It was able to reach more than 55,000
feet and could cruise at Mach 2 speeds. Kropf (2002)
mentions an unofficial world record, when in 1966 a twin-
seat F-104F accelerated from a standstill on the runway to
Mach 2 within 3.5 minutes. The design also included
sophisticated avionic features: a stability augmentation
system improved the jet’s handling characteristics; a
boundary layer control system utilized compressor bleed
air to energize the airflow over the landing flaps, thus
enabling reduced approach speeds; and an automatic pitch
control system was incorporated, which included a stick
shaker and a stick kicker to prevent pilots from exceeding
angle of attack limits (Bowman, 2000; Kropf, 2002; USAF,
1960)
Germany demanded still more avionic systems to be
built into its G-model. Among others, these included: an
anti-skid system for the wheel brakes; an inertial navigation
system to make the jet independent of external navigation
aids; an auto pilot system was included to relieve the pilot;
and a new multi-function radar was built into its nose.
Lastly, two different bombing computers (M2 and dual
timer) were incorporated for the respective delivery of
conventional and nuclear ordnance (Bundesministerium
der Verteidiung [BMVg], 1985; Lemke, 2006; Lockheed,
1960).
However, this cutting-edge performance came with a
price tag. For instance, its distinct T-tail configuration
offered increased performance over other tail designs, such
as reduced drag and thus increased performance. It also
provided improved stability and pitch control over a wide
speed range. But this design came with a disadvantage, too.
Most aircraft tend to lower their nose when exceeding the
critical angle of attack (AOA) which usually alleviates the
situation. The F-104’s T-tail design in contrast induced the
exact opposite behavior. When approaching the critical
AOA, vortices from the aircraft’s forward section would
strike the T-tail, thus forcing a snap increase in AOA.
This phenomenon, called ‘‘pitch-up,’’ required a significant
amount of altitude below the aircraft for successful
recovery—if it was recoverable at all (Reaves, 1961). To
enable safe aircraft operation and to prevent pitch-up from
occurring in the first place, the mentioned automatic pitch
control system was built into to the F-104. This system was
not only AOA-dependent, but also measured the aircraft’s
pitch-change rate. Thus, a stick shaker would warn a pilot
from impending critical situations, and if the situation
aggravated further the ‘‘kicker’’ fired and manually pushed
the control stick forward.
Consequently, most pilots recall that the F-104 was not a
very forgiving aircraft. Rall (2004, p. 284) recalls a
pondering test pilot saying, ‘‘it’s an honest airplane. If
you make a mistake, it will kill you.’’ But not all judgments
were this harsh. Vogler (1986, p. 10) recalls: ‘‘She was
never moody, unpredictable, spiteful or even dangerous…
She represents simply the peak of what a carefully selected
and trained individual, in full possession of his mental and
physical faculties, can master.’’
On the other hand, almost a third of all acquired German
Starfighters crashed. This stunning attrition rate must be
seen in relation to its flying hours (i.e., accident rate), in
relation to other F-104 users, and in relation to co-era
platforms.
It has been pointed out that by the end of its service life
the German F-104 accident rates had settled to international
standards in the vicinity of two accidents per 10,000 flight
hours.
Table 1 shows the accident rates of co-era USAF
fighters. It should be noted that the USAF F-104 accident
rates rank by far on top.
Table 2 shows the engine-related accident rates of
single-engine and twin-engine co-era USAF fighters. It
should be noted that the USAF F-104 engine-related
accidents rank by far on top, and that the F-4 with two J-79
engines ranks considerably lower.
Table 1
Co-era USAF fighter accident rates.
Aircraft type
Accident rate per 100,000








Note. Co-era USAF fighter accident rates per 100,000 flight hours. Even if
modern types are reviewed the F-104 ranks by far on top in terms of
accident rates in USAF service. Adapted from Lyons and Nace (2007).
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All in all the existing literature indicates that the F-104
was on the upper end of what 1950s technology could
achieve—and on the upper end of what human beings
can master. Moreover, by 1960 aviation technology
was fairly reliable. When the F-104G went into produc-
tion it was already more likely that accidents were caused
by the ‘‘human factor’’ than by technological flaws
(Dekker, 2002; Helmreich & Foushee, 2010; Shappell &
Wiegmann, 2001). Hence, a comprehensive accident
analysis should encompass the F-104’s technology and
the environment in which it was operated, but also the
human factor and the conditions under which the pilots
operated this aircraft. The HFACS offers such a compre-
hensive taxonomy. Broadly speaking, accidents and
human error can be viewed in two distinctly different
ways: (a) in a person approach to human error or (b) in a
system approach to human error.
The person approach to human error is a longstanding
and die-hard view on unsafe acts. It usually focuses on the
individual committing an unsafe act, i.e., the operator. This
approach frequently identifies incompetence, inattention, or
poor motivation as root causes for unsafe acts. Hence, this
traditional view tends to see errors as individual short-
comings or even character flaws. Thereby the person
approach to human error usually fosters a culture of naming
and blaming. One evident effect of blame cultures is that
they preclude safety cultures. In safety cultures individuals
are encouraged to admit their errors to prevent others from
repeating them.
In contrast, the system approach is a comprehensive
approach to accidents and human errors, which tries to
establish the whole picture. While it recognizes that human
beings are fallible and will make mistakes, it also tries to
identify the preconditions of unsafe acts, i.e., the conditions
under which individuals operate (Dekker, 2002; Reason,
2000).
The aftermath of accidents or incidents usually provides
ample information on an organization’s safety culture and
its approach to human error: if an organization’s remedy
aims at an individual alone (i.e., naming, blaming, sham-
ing, retraining, disciplinary measures) it is a good indicator
for the person approach to human errors. In contrast, an
organization that analyses which safety feature has failed
and whether organizational processes should be reviewed is
likely to have adopted the system approach to accidents and
human errors (Dekker, 2002; Reason, 2000).
Reason (1990) has advertised the latter view, i.e., the
system approach to accidents and human error. He has
suggested that in any organization human error can occur
on four different levels. Each level represents a different
safety layer with specific mechanisms to prevent failures.
While historically accident investigators have often paid
a disproportionate amount of attention to the lowest safety
layer (i.e., Level-1 ‘‘Unsafe Acts’’), Reason recognizes
three more safety layers: Level-2 ‘‘Preconditions for Unsafe
Acts’’; Level-3 ‘‘Unsafe Supervision’’; and Level-4 ‘‘Orga-
nizational Influences.’’ This model is commonly referred to
as the Swiss cheese model.
Reason recognizes that active failures occur exclusively
on the lowest level (i.e., Level-1 ‘‘Unsafe Acts’’), which is
why this level usually receives the mentioned increased
attention in the aftermath of events. The other three layers
only contain latent failures, which may have existed
unrecognized for years before a mishap. A ‘‘hole in a
cheese slice’’ indicates a failure in the respective safety
layer. If these holes are aligned in a way that an ‘‘event
trajectory’’ is permitted, a mishap will be the result (Reason,
1990, 2000).
While the Swiss cheese model enables a look beyond the
simplistic person approach to accidents and human error, it
still is only useful for analyzing mishaps with hindsight. It
is hardly useable for predicting trajectories and mishaps.
Moreover, Reason did not specify what the ‘‘holes’’ in each
slice are. Hence, this model lacked usability.
Shappell and Wiegmann (2000) developed a model
called HFACS, which is a direct descendent of Reason’s
Swiss cheese model. This model recognizes the same four
levels of failure, but specifies each level distinctly. Each
level can be subdivided into different categories. For
instance:
Level-1 ‘‘Unsafe Acts’’ can be broken into two diffe-
rent unsafe act Categories, which are ‘‘Errors’’ and
‘‘Violations.’’ Errors and Violations in turn can be broken
down into Error types (i.e., Decision Errors, Skill-Based
Errors, and Perceptual Errors) and Violation types (i.e.,
Routine Violations, Exceptional Violations). Depending on
required granularity, each error type can be further sub-
divided into different categories (Shappell & Wiegmann,
2000, 2001, 2003).
This model is a comprehensive system approach for the
analysis of accidents. Shappell and Wiegmann (2003) have
provided detailed guidance on the coding of Unsafe Acts
(Level-1) and their preconditions (Level-2 to Level-4).
Table 2
USAF engine-related accident rates (single-engine and twin-engine
aircraft).










F-111 0.49 T F-30
Note. Co-era USAF engine-related accident rates per 100,000 flight hours.
The F-104 ranks by far on top in terms of engine-related accident rates in
USAF service. Adapted from USAF (2015a, 2015b).
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Hence, it is a very user-friendly model and enables coders
to pinpoint where ‘‘holes in a cheese slice’’ have opened up.
However, as pointed out earlier, an organizational and
managerial analysis of Germany’s Air Force and Navy
is beyond the scope of this paper. Hence, for the purpose
of this research the HFACS analysis is limited to its first
level (unsafe acts). Still, the second level (Preconditions
for Unsafe Acts—Environmental Factors—Technological
Environment and Physical Environment) will also be
addressed in the results and discussion sections of this
paper.
Errors can be defined as ‘‘mental or physical activities of
individuals that fail to achieve their intended outcome.’’
Violations in contrast can be defined as ‘‘the willful dis-
regard for rules and regulations’’ (Shappell & Wiegmann,
2000, p. 3). What follows is an explanation of the different
error types and violation types. While this is only an
excerpt, Shappell and Wiegmann (2003) have listed
numerous examples in checklist form to aid a correct
coding.
Decision Errors represent behavior which proceeds
according to a plan—yet, the plan was inappropriate for
the given situation. Decision Errors are sometimes referred
to as ‘‘honest mistakes,’’ and can be further divided into
three categories: (a) Procedural Errors, (b) Choice Errors,
and (c) Problem Solving Errors.
Aviation examples for Procedural Errors are flawed ‘‘if–
then’’ decisions, such as the application of an incorrect
compressor stall clearing procedure, or flying an inap-
propriate maneuver.
An example for a Choice Error is the futile attempt to
out-climb a thunderstorm, and ending up in the middle of it.
Another example is a continued takeoff run instead of an
abort, despite an afterburner failure.
Problem solving errors can occur, when a problem is not
well understood, for instance due to a lack of information,
training, or experience. For example, a misdiagnosed
emergency situation would constitute a problem solving
error (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000, 2001, 2003).
Skill-Based Errors represent errors in which a task’s
demands exceed an individual’s skills. Applied to aviation,
Skill-Based Errors are failures of pilot basic flying skills,
also known as ‘‘stick and rudder skills.’’ An example of
such a basic failure would be to stall an aircraft on
approach. This error type can further be subdivided into
three categories: (a) Attention Failures, (b) Memory
Failures, and (c) Manner or Technique.
Two aviation examples for Attention Failures are (a) the
breakdown of a pilot’s visual scan, also known as cross-
check, or (b) task fixation and channelized attention. Other
examples are (c) distraction and (d) the inadvertent move-
ment of flight controls. All of these Attention Failures
could induce the mentioned stall on approach.
Examples for Memory Failures are omitted checklist
steps or omitted steps of an emergency procedure.
Poor Operation Manners or Techniques refer to a pilot’s
inappropriate operation of the aircraft, such as manhandling
it close to the ground, thus leading to a loss of control
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000, 2001, 2003).
During flight pilots are exposed to different types of
unnatural perceptions and sensations. These can lead to
judgement errors, mostly when in impaired sensory
conditions such as night flying or while flying in clouds.
A well-known phenomenon in these conditions is spatial
disorientation. However, spatial disorientation is no Per-
ceptual Error. But a wrong pilot response to spatial
disorientation constitutes a Perceptual Error. Misjudging
the distance to the ground during a pull-out from a dive is
another example for a Perceptual Error. Hence, Perceptual
errors usually occur either in impaired sensory conditions
or in high-task-load situations (Shappell & Wiegmann,
2000, 2001, 2003).
A Routine Violation is the deliberate and repeated
violation of rules, such as frequently driving 20 km/h faster
than permitted. An aviation example could be repeatedly
and deliberately underflying minimum altitudes; another
one would be the habit of underflying highway bridges.
Routine Violations do not occur as a single event and are
more often than not known to and tolerated by superiors,
who fail to enforce the rules (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000,
2001, 2003).
Exceptional Violations in contrast to Routine Violations
are isolated departures of individuals who normally adhere
to regulations and rules. An example could be to fly an
aileron roll on a departure due to high spirits. An Exceptional
Violation is neither characteristic for this individual, nor does
it occur expectedly—which is why it is almost impossible to
predict (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000, 2001, 2003).
Hypotheses
As pointed out in the introduction, two simplistic and
contradicting views on the F-104 prevail: on the one hand,
the myth of the poorly designed pilot-killer; on the other
hand, a somewhat sentimental pilot myth of the F-104
(Reis, 2012). Yet, both views on the F-104 are in conflict
with current research. It is thus generally hypothesized that
the F-104 is no outlier and that during its last years of
operation the F-104 had similar accident trends to those of
other military aircraft. Specifically, it is expected that a
large number of those accidents can be attributed to human
error and to the environment in which the F-104 was
operated. Hence, the following specific hypotheses will be
tested:
H1A: The relative distribution of Errors and Violations
contributing to German F-104 losses differs significantly
from USAF accidents.
H2A: The number of Decision Errors contributing to
German F-104 losses differs significantly from USAF
accidents.
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H3A: The number of Skill-Based Errors contributing to
German F-104 losses differs significantly from USAF
accidents.
H4A: The number of Perceptual Errors contributing to
German F-104 losses differs significantly from USAF
accidents.
H5A: The number of Violations (Routine and Excep-
tional) contributing to German F-104 losses differs signif-
icantly from USAF accidents.
H6A: A strong association exists between error type and
pilot flying hours on F-104.
Methodology
Empirical research was conducted to test these hypoth-
eses in a quasi-experimental research design. The test group
consists of a sample of 71 non-randomized German
military Starfighter losses in the time frame from 1978 to
1986, which were analyzed with HFACS as method. These
results were quantitatively compared with a control group
of 72 non-randomized USAF accidents in a seven-year time
frame from 1991 to 1997.
All German military aviation accident files are stored
in the central archive of General Flugsicherheit der
Bundeswehr (GenFlSichhBw) [Directorate of Aviation
Safety, Federal Armed Forces]. These data are not
accessible to the public. This research’s authors were
granted access to the original accident files by the
Commanding Officer of GenFlSichhBw (Annex 2).
The USAF data have been analyzed and published by
Shappell and Wiegmann (2004), by Lyons and Nace (2007)
and by the USAF itself (2015a, 2015b).
GenFlSichhBw has granted this research under the
following conditions (Annex 2): (a) Research will exclu-
sively be performed at the Directorate of Aviation Safety;
(b) the analysis will be anonymous; (c) copies may be made
at the Directorate of Aviation Safety, but will not leave the
building and will be kept on file; (d) Scientific publications
must remain anonymous; and (e) the research’s results will
be made available to Director of Aviation Safety prior to
publication.
Although 71 F-104 crashes were reviewed and coded,
37 had to be excluded from the hypothesis tests. The reason
for this is two-fold: either no unsafe act occurred in that
accident or the accident cause could not be identified. In 17
accidents the engine failed for technical reasons (techno-
logical environment). In 11 cases the engine failed after a
bird strike (physical environment). Seven accidents had
to be excluded for reasons other than the technological
environment, such as controllability problems, stuck fuel,
or gear malfunctions. Finally, one accident cause could not
be identified and another aircraft vanished with its pilot into
the Mediterranean Sea, leaving no trace.
It should be noted that the F-104 was neither equipped
with a flight data recorder nor a cockpit voice recorder.
Hence, those accident investigations were always challen-
ging.
Although the hypothesis tests could only be conducted
with a reduced test group of 34 cases, the research question
can still be sufficiently addressed as to whether the German
F-104s crashed for different reasons from those for other
military aircraft. The USAF control group consists of 72
aircraft losses.
The coding into HFACS categories was performed
according to the comprehensive and detailed descriptions
of Shappell and Wiegmann (2000, 2001, 2003). The
provided checklists were used to prevent omissions. Only
the findings from the original investigation reports were
taken into account and coded accordingly. No additions
were made, nor were any findings left out.
In a very few special cases a translation of findings into
contemporary concepts was required, though. For instance
the concept of crew resource management (CRM) was not
recognized in the original accident files, but is a separate
Level-2 Personnel Factor type. For this translation the
NOTECHS schema of CRM was applied (i.e., Leadership,
Cooperation, Situation Awareness, Decision Making, and
Communication). As an example, if inappropriate commu-
nication was one finding, it was thus coded as ‘‘CRM’’
finding (Flin et al., 2003). However, neither of those special
cases was required for the HFACS Level-1 analysis.
Next, the HFACS Level-1 data were quantified to be
tested against H1 to H6. These data are depicted together
with the control group’s data in Tables 3 and 6.
This research’s author was the only HFACS coder of the
accidents. The author is an active duty German Air Force
officer, instructor pilot and weapons instructor on the
Typhoon jet. As such he is an expert in aviation matters.
Moreover, HFACS has repeatedly been tested on the
coding process reliability, its intra- as well as inter-rater
reliability, and its consistency by Shappell & Wiegmann
(2001, 2003), Hooper and O’Hare (2013), Ergai (2013),
and Ergai et al. (2016) with excellent results, indicating the
model’s high reliability and consistency. In practical terms,
therefore, even with only a single coder the data reliability
can be regarded as sufficiently high.
The HFACS analysis provides both qualitative and
quantitative data. To test hypotheses H1 and H6, nonpara-
metric tests have been selected. H1 was tested with a
chi-square goodness-of-fit test, while H6 was tested with a
chi-square independence test (Weiss, 2016).
Since the research question for this project is whether the
German F-104s crashed for different reasons from those for
other military aircraft, the chi-square goodness-of-fit test is
suitable to test the relative distribution of Errors and
Violations between both samples.
The assumptions for a chi-square goodness-of-fit test are:
(a) all expected frequencies are 1 or greater; (b) at most
20% of the expected frequencies are less than 5; and (c)
simple random sample (Weiss, 2016).
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The assumptions (a) and (b) have been fulfilled
(Table 4). Assumption (c) has not been fulfilled, due to
the quasi-experimental research design. The nine-year time
frame and the intended sample size of 71 accidents were
meant to induce randomization. Still, the method will be
performed and its statistical power will be addressed.
Following the HFACS coding, Table 3 was constructed,
which depicts the relative frequency of errors and
violations for both test and control groups. Since accidents
are rarely caused by a single factor only, the sum of errors
and violations consequently exceeds 100%. However, a
chi-square goodness-of-fit hypothesis test requires the sums
of observed and expected relative frequency to add up to
100% each (Faul et al., 2007; Mayr et al., 2007; Weiss,
2016). Hence, each causation’s relative frequency had to be
factorized (0.6897 for USAF, 0.7556 for F-104) to achieve
a sum of 100% (Table 4). It must be noted that the
numerical relation of error and violation types remains
unchanged by the factorization.
The chi-square goodness-of-fit calculations were per-
formed with the StatCrunch online computer program.
After determination of the chi-square value, the P-value
approach was used to accept or reject the null hypothesis
(Table5).
It has been pointed out that the F-104 was not a very
forgiving aircraft. Moreover, it has been suggested that a
correlation exists between pilot experience in flying hours
and accident rates (Knecht, 2012, 2013; Panitzki, 1966).
The chi-square independence test is suitable to examine
correlations between flying hours and causation type.
The assumptions for a chi-square independence test are
the same as for the chi-square goodness-of-fit test: (a) all
expected frequencies are 1 or greater; (b) at most 20% of
the expected frequencies are less than 5; and (c) simple
random sample (Weiss, 2016).
Assumption (a) has again been fulfilled. Assumption (b)
could not be fulfilled, solely due to the reduced sample size
(Tables 7 and 8). Assumption (c) was once more not
fulfilled, due to the quasi-experimental research design.
Still, the method will be performed and the reduced
statistical power will be addressed.
Following the HFACS coding, Table 7 was constructed,
which depicts the observed frequencies of error types in
relation to flying hours on aircraft type. For the flying hours
on type, 500-hour intervals were chosen. Table 7 was
developed into a contingency table (Table 8) which depicts
both observed and expected frequencies for each error type
in relation to flying hours on type.
The chi-square independence test calculations were
performed with the StatCrunch online computer program.
After determination of the chi-square value, the P-value
approach was used to accept or reject the null hypothesis
(Table 9). H2 up to and including H5 can be tested with
descriptive statistics (Table 6) and numerical comparison
(Weiss, 2016).
Shappell and Wiegmann (2001, 2003) as well as Ergai
(2013) have described in detail why the HFACS framework
can be regarded as a valid methodology for post-accident
analyses. They have argued that content validity, face
validity, and construct validity are essential for any
taxonomy to be usable and that those are clearly present
in HFACS. Content validity refers to a method’s com-
prehensiveness and reliability. Both have already been
sufficiently addressed and it can therefore be inferred that
the HFACS method has a high content validity.
Face validity refers to whether a method really measures
what it is meant to measure and goes hand in hand with
content validity. Shappell and Wiegmann (2001, 2003) as
well as Ergai (2013) have delineated that research on
HFACS as a methodology has demonstrated the frame-
work’s face validity. Construct validity relates to a
taxonomy’s ability to close the gap between theory and
practice. In the case of HFACS as human error taxonomy
the question must be answered as to whether this frame-
work only describes errors and accidents, or whether it
aids in identifying the underlying causes. Shappell and
Wiegmann (2001, 2003) as well as Ergai (2013) have
outlined that research on HFACS as a methodology has
supported the existence of construct validity of the
framework. Per definition quasi-experimental designs have
a lower internal validity than true experiments (Bradley,
2018). To offset the reduced internal validity of quasi-
experiments, a large sample size was meant to increase the
research design’s accuracy. The desired sample size for
high internal validity was derived a priori with the
G*Power computer program (see Statistical power deter-
mination section).
In addition to the statistical power prediction, the
research design and methodology follow established scien-
tific standards. Hence, this research is expected to have a
high internal validity (Michael, n.d.).
Statistical power describes the probability that research
will detect a certain effect, if this effect exists in the first
place. This effect is usually expressed as large (i.e., 0.5),
medium (i.e., 0.3), or small (i.e., 0.1). High statistical
power is desired since it means statistically significant
results, whereas low statistical power may mean incon-
clusive results. A statistical power level of 0.8 is commonly
used for meaningful results (Brownlee, 2018; Power
Analysis, n.d.).
Thus, a power analysis should be performed before
conducting an experiment or quasi-experiment to calculate
the desired sample size to achieve meaningful results
(Bower, 2008; Brownlee, 2018; Power Analysis, n.d.). To
this end three chi-square a priori tests were conducted.
In order to achieve a very high statistical power of 0.95
(0.80 being commonly used) at a significance level of a 5
0.05 with a large effect size (w 5 0.5) and DF 5 3 (for a
4 6 2 contingency table), a total sample size (i.e., test
group plus control group) of 69 is required (Brownlee,
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2018; Faul et al., 2007; G*Power, 2017; Mayr et al., 2007).
Hence, the planned test group sample of 71 was appropriate
(total sample size n 5 143).
In order to achieve the commonly accepted statistical
power of 0.8 at a significance level of a 5 0.05 with a
medium effect size (w 5 0.3) and DF 5 3 (for a 4 6 2
contingency table), a total sample size (i.e., test group plus
control group) of 122 is required (Brownlee, 2018; Faul
et al., 2007; G*Power, 2017; Mayr et al., 2007). Hence,
the planned test group sample of 71 was again appropriate
(total sample size n 5 143).
The HFACS coding led to a reduced test group sample of
only 34 accidents (i.e., total sample size n 5 106). Hence,
another a priori test was conducted. In order to achieve a
slightly lower statistical power level than commonly used
(i.e., 0.73) at a significance level of a 5 0.05 with a
medium effect size (w 5 0.3) and DF 5 3 (for a 4 6 2
contingency table), a total sample size (i.e., test group plus
control group) of n 5 104 is required (Brownlee, 2018;
Faul et al., 2007; G*Power, 2017; Mayr et al., 2007).
Hence, the predicted statistical power of the chi-square
hypotheses tests will be slightly lower than commonly
used.
External validity means that a generalization of results is
possible. Among other prerequisites, a scientific research
method is required, as well as high internal validity, a
representative test group, and sufficient statistical power
(Michael, n.d.). In the presented research the scientific
method, internal validity, and the test group have been
sufficiently addressed to enable generalization. Thus, the
greatest challenge to the presented research’s external
validity is the statistical power of the chi-square analyses.
Therefore, a post hoc analysis was conducted with the
G*Power computer program.
Statistical power determination
For the chi-square goodness-of-fit test’s post hoc anal-
ysis the expected and observed frequencies of Table 4 were
used. G*Power calculated an existing medium effect size of
w 5 0.307 at a significance level of a 5 0.05 and DF 5 3
(for a 4 6 2 contingency table). For a total sample size of
n 5 106 (i.e., test group plus control group) a statistical
power (1 2 b) of 0.76 was calculated (Faul et al., 2007;
G*Power, 2017; Mayr et al., 2007).
Hence, for an observed medium effect size, the com-
puted statistical power is slightly lower than commonly
accepted, but higher than predicted (Brownlee, 2018). For
the originally planned total sample size of 143 the statistical
power would have been 0.88 with otherwise unchanged
parameters. Although the reduction of the test group
sample had a negative effect on the presented research’s
statistical power, it still produced meaningful results with
an effect size of w 5 0.307 and a power of 0.76.
G*Power cannot be used to calculate the statistical
power of chi-square independence tests. But since two out
of three assumptions could not be fulfilled the results will
be regarded as chi-square suspect and addressed in the
results section.
Results
H1 Hypothesis Test (Inferential Statistics)
It was hypothesized that the relative distribution of
Errors and Violations contributing to German F-104 losses
does not differ significantly from USAF accidents. This
hypothesis was tested with a chi-square goodness-of-fit
test. Tables 3 and 4 show the HFACS Level-1 coding
results for the test and control groups.
Table 4 shows the chi-square goodness-of-fit contin-
gency table, which is used to test H1. Table 3 shows the
differences between German F-104 expected and observed
relative frequencies, which are used to test H2 to H5. The
single most striking result is the large number of Skill-
Based Errors in German F-104 accidents (i.e., 55.56%).
To accept or reject H10, the chi-square goodness-of-fit
test must be continued either with the critical value
approach or with the P-value approach (Weiss, 2016).
Since StatCrunch provides the P-value, the latter approach
is chosen.
Table 5 shows a P-value of 0.0242. It must be checked
whether P # a (a being the significance level of 0.05) to
reject H10; if P . a, H10 should not be rejected.
In this case P (0.0242) is smaller than a (0.05). Hence,
H10 should be rejected and H1A should be favored.
This means that at the 5% significance level there is
sufficient evidence that the relative distribution of Errors
and Violations contributing to German F-104 losses differs
significantly from USAF accidents.
H2 Hypothesis Test (Descriptive Statistics)
It was hypothesized that the number of Decision Errors
contributing to German F-104 losses does not differ
significantly from USAF accidents.
Decision Errors contributed to 44% of USAF accidents
(Table 6). Therefore, in order to favor H20 and reject H2A,
Decision Errors must have contributed to German F-104
accidents in a span of 41.8% to 46.2%. However, Decision
Errors only contributed to 35.29% of German F-104
accidents. Hence, H20 should be rejected and H2A should
be favored.
This means that at the 5% significance level there is
sufficient evidence that the number of Decision Errors
contributing to German F-104 losses differs significantly
from USAF accidents.






German F-104: expected relative
frequency 1978–1986
German F-104: observed relative
frequency 1978–1986
Decision Errors 44 44 35.29
Skill-Based Errors 60 60 73.53
Perceptual Errors 33 33 17.65
Violations 8 8 5.88
Note. The results do not add up to 100%, since accidents usually have multiple causations.
Table 4




German F-104: expected relative
frequency 1978–1986
German F-104: observed relative
frequency 1978–1986
Decision Errors 30.34 30.34 26.66
Skill-Based Errors 41.38 41.38 55.56
Perceptual Errors 22.76 22.76 13.34
Violations 5.52 5.52 4.44
Total 100 100 100
Note. Results after factorization (i.e., 0.689 for USAF and 0.7556 for F-104) to achieve totals of 100. Numerical relations of Table 3 are unchanged.
Table 5
Chi-square goodness-of-fit results.
N DF Chi-square P-value
100 3 9.415615 0.0242
Table 6
Histogram of HFACS Level-1 coding results (observed relative frequency according Table 3).
Note. The results do not add up to 100%, since accidents usually have multiple causations.
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H3 Hypothesis Test (Descriptive Statistics)
It was hypothesized that the number of Skill-Based
Errors contributing to German F-104 losses does not differ
significantly from USAF accidents.
Skill-Based Errors contributed to 60% of USAF acci-
dents (Table 6). Therefore, in order to favor H30 and reject
H3A, Skill-Based Errors must have contributed to German
F-104 accidents in a span of 57% to 63%. However, Skill-
Based Errors contributed to 73.5% of German F-104
accidents. Hence, H30 should be rejected and H3A should
be favored.
This means that at the 5% significance level there is
sufficient evidence that the number of Skill-Based Errors
contributing to German F-104 losses differs significantly
from USAF accidents.
H4 Hypothesis Test (Descriptive Statistics)
It was hypothesized that the number of Perceptual Errors
contributing to German F-104 losses does not differ
significantly from USAF accidents.
Perceptual Errors contributed to 33% of USAF accidents
(Table 6). Therefore, in order to favor H40 and reject H4A,
Perceptual Errors must have contributed to German F-104
accidents in a span of 31.35% to 34.65%. However,
Perceptual Errors only contributed to 17.65% of German
F-104 accidents. Hence, H40 should be rejected and H4A
should be favored.
This means that at the 5% significance level there is
sufficient evidence that the number of Perceptual Errors
contributing to German F-104 losses differs significantly
from USAF accidents.
H5 Hypothesis Test (Descriptive Statistics)
It was hypothesized that the number of Violations
(Routine and Exceptional) contributing to German
F-104 losses does not differ significantly from USAF
accidents.
Violations contributed to 8% of USAF accidents
(Table 6). Therefore, in order to favor H50 and reject
H5A, Violations must have contributed to German F-104
accidents in a span of 7.6% to 8.4%. However, Vio-
lations only contributed to 5.88% of German F-104
accidents. Hence, H50 should be rejected and H5A
should be favored.
This means that at the 5% significance level there is
sufficient evidence that the number of Violations contribut-
ing to German F-104 losses differs significantly from
USAF accidents.
H6 Hypothesis Test (Inferential Statistics)
It was hypothesized that no strong association exists
between error type and pilot flying hours on F-104.
This hypothesis was tested with a chi-square indepen-
dence test. Tables 7 and 8 show the HFACS Level-1
coding results (excluding violations) and their relative
distribution in 500-hour intervals.
To accept or reject H60, the chi-square independence
test must be continued either with the critical value
approach or with the P-value approach (Weiss, 2016).
Since StatCrunch provides the P-value, the latter approach
is chosen.
Table 9 shows a P-value of 0.574. It must be checked
whether P # a (a being the significance level of 0.05) to
reject H60; if P . a, H60 should not be rejected.
In this case P (0.574) is larger than a (0.05). Hence, H60
should be favored while H6A should be rejected.
This means that at the 5% significance level there is no
sufficient evidence for an association between error type
and pilot flying hours on F-104. However, H6 should
remain undetermined, since two out of three assumptions
for a chi-square independence test could not be fulfilled.
This will be addressed in the discussion section.
Table 7
Chi-square independence test (observed frequencies).
Accident causation 1–500 flying hours on F-104 501–1000 flying hours on F-104 .1000 flying hours on F-104 Total
Decision Errors 2 5 5 12
Skill-Based Errors 9 10 6 25
Perceptual Errors 1 2 3 6
Total 12 17 14 43
Table 8
Chi-square independence test contingency table (observed and expected frequencies).
Accident causation 1–500 flying hours on F-104 501–1000 flying hours on F-104 .1000 flying hours on F-104 Total
Decision Errors 2 (3.35) 5 (4.74) 5 (3.91) 12
Skill-Based Errors 9 (6.98) 10 (9.88) 6 (8.14) 25
Perceptual Errors 1 (1.67) 2 (2.37) 3 (1.95) 6
Total 12 17 14 43
Note. Expected frequencies in parentheses.
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Other Results
This research’s first unexpected result is the large
number of accidents without any unsafe act whatsoever.
From the original sample of 71 accidents, two had to be
withdrawn due to unknown accident causations. This left a
sample of 69 accidents. Of those 69 accidents, 17 aircraft
crashed after their engine failed for technical reasons. In
another 11 cases the engine failed after a bird strike;
additionally, seven aircraft crashed due to technical issues,
such as controllability problems, stuck fuel, or gear
malfunctions (Table 10). Hence, 35 (i.e., 50.72%) of these
69 accidents occurred without any unsafe act whatsoever
(HFACS Level-2). This means that human factor causes
could only be attributed to 49.28% of the F-104 sample.
Therefore, the German F-104 accidents are different from
other military aircraft accidents, to begin with.
Moreover, 24.64% of the sample crashed due engine
failures, while another 10.14% crashed for other technical
reasons. Hence, the second unexpected result was that more
than a third of the sample’s accidents (i.e., 34.78%)
occurred exclusively due the Technological Environment
(HFACS Level-2).
Another 15.94% were attributed to engine failures
following a bird strike, which means due to the Physical
Environment (HFACS Level-2) in which the aircraft was
operated. Bird strikes are largely beyond an organization’s
or pilot’s control. Hence, 15.94% of the German Starfighter
accidents can be regarded as ‘‘the price of doing business’’
with a single-engine turbojet fighter in the low-altitude
environment that Naval and Air Force strike aircraft popu-
lated at the time.
When looking at engine failures in isolation, 17 aircraft
crashed after their engine failed for technical reasons (i.e.,
24.64%) and another 11 after engine failure following a
bird strike (i.e., 15.94%). Thus, 28 aircraft crashed after
their engine failed, which constitutes 40.58% of the sample.
This is the third unexpected result and this elevated level of
engine failures needs to be addressed later on.
Summary
In five out of six cases the alternative hypothesis was
supported. The chi-square goodness-of-fit test showed that
the relative distribution of Errors and Violations in German
F-104 accidents differs significantly from USAF accidents
(H1A). Moreover, the USAF accidents contained signifi-
cantly more Decision Errors, significantly fewer Skill-
Based Errors, significantly more Perceptual Errors, and
significantly more Violations. Thus H2A to H5A were
favored over H20 to H50. Lastly, it was decided that H6
should remain undetermined, since two out of three
assumptions for a chi-square independence test could not
be fulfilled. The latter was a direct result of the test group’s
necessary reduction from 71 to only 34 cases: in addition
to two undetermined accident causes, 35 accidents (i.e.,
50.72%) occurred without an unsafe act whatsoever, but
due to the Physical Environment and/or the Technological
Environment (both Level-2: Preconditions for Unsafe
Acts).
Discussion
This project’s research question was to find out whether
the German F-104s crashed for different reasons from
those for other military aircraft. Some results were most
unexpected and, consequently, six different aspects need to
be addressed in this discussion: (a) the number of German
F-104 accidents without unsafe act; (b) the German F-104
accident rate in relation to that of its predecessor and
in relation to USAF macro trends; (c) the German F-104
accident rate in relation to USAF F-104 accidents and
other co-era USAF fighters; (d) engine-related German
F-104 accidents in relation to engine-related USAF acci-
dents; (e) the HFACS Level-1 distribution in German
F-104 accidents; and (f) other findings.
It was expected that the Starfighter’s safety record would
be much better than its reputation suggests and that it did
not crash for reasons different from those for other military
aircraft. It was also expected the vast number of accidents
would be attributed to human error, and would hence be in
line with contemporary research (Dekker, 2002; Helmreich
& Foushee, 2010; Shappell & Wiegmann, 2001).
As pointed out in the results, 50.72% of the accidents
occurred without unsafe act but due to the technological
and physical environment. Hence, not only did the German
F-104 crash for reasons different from those for other
military aircraft (H1 to H5), but it also crashed significantly
more often due to technological shortcomings and the
environment in which it was operated (Table 10).
It has been suggested that a different view on the
German Starfighter losses is possible. The Starfighter’s
Table 9
Chi-square independence test results.
Statistic DF Value P-value
Chi-square 4 2.9040056 0.574
Table 10
German F-104 accidents without unsafe act.
Causation Rate (N 5 69)
Engine failure 24.64% (n 5 17)
Engine failure after bird strike 15.94% (n 5 11)
Other technical failure 10.14% (n 5 7)
Total 50.72% (n 5 35)
Note. From the sample of N 5 71, two accidents had to be excluded due to
unknown accident causation.
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predecessor in service with Germany’s Fighter Bomber
Wings was the Republic’s F-84. The German Air Force
acquired 558 F-84s of different types, of which 202 were
lost (Reis, 2012). This constitutes an attrition rate of 36.2%
for the F-84, in contrast to 31.88% for the F-104 (i.e., 916
acquired and 292 lost). Moreover, Reis (2012) and Siano
(2016) have pointed out that the Starfighter’s annual
accident rate was also slightly lower than the F-84’s rate.
The argument goes that since no public outcry occurred
in the case of the F-84, there should not have been one in
the case of the F-104 either. And after all, other F-104 users
had even higher loss rates (Table 1)—hence, the Starfighter
losses could be seen as less dramatic than public opinion
has it.
While at first glance the previously mentioned arguments
appear convincing, three aspects deserve attention. (a) It is
misleading that Schlieper (1995) and Kropf (2002) express
the F-104’s accident rate in accidents per 10,000 flight
hours; accident rates are usually expressed in accidents per
100,000 flight hours. While two accidents per 10,000 flight
hours appears to be reasonably low, 20 accidents per
100,000 flight hours is not a low rate at all. Besides, for
most German units this accident rate meant an average loss
of two aircraft per year, and one fatality every 1.5 years. (b)
From 1950 onwards the USAF’s overall accident rate has
been steadily declining and after 1965 it has been
constantly below five accidents per 100,000 flying hours
(Kitfield, 1996; Shappell & Wiegmann, 2003; USAF,
2000). A comparison with other USAF fighter types
follows in subsequent paragraphs. Hence, although the
German F-104’s accident and attrition rates were slightly
lower than those of its legacy predecessor, this accident rate
was still three to four times higher than the USAF standard
from 1965 onwards. (c) Public outcry or not, the F-84’s
attrition rate should by no means be regarded as normal or
acceptable (see below).
Lyons and Nace (2007) have reviewed and analyzed 25
historical USAF airframes and compared their accident
rates (Table 1). For the USAF’s F-104 they found a final
cumulative crash rate of 306.3 crashes per million flight
hours—i.e., 30.63 accidents per 100,000 flying hours
during its 28 years in the USAF inventory.
So, on the one hand, the German F-104 accident rate was
finally distinctly lower than the USAF’s F-104 accident rate
(15 to 20 accidents versus 30.63 accidents per 100,000
flying hours); but on the other hand, both the USAF
F-104’s and the German F-104’s accident rates were
distinctly higher than the standard USAF accident rate (five
or less accidents per 100,000 flying hours; see previous
discussion).
Besides, even this ‘‘reduced’’ German F-104 accident
rate would still grant it a top ranking in comparison to co-
era USAF fighters (Table 1). Only the USAF F-104’s
accident rate is even higher (30.36 accidents per 100,000
flight hours), followed by F-100 (21.22), F-105 (17.83), F-
101 (14.65), F-102 (13.69), F-106 (9.47), and F-5 (8.82).
This means that both the German and the USAF F-104
accident rates are unsurpassed by any co-era or succeeding
type in the USAF inventory. Hence, it is very reasonable to
infer that the F-104 as a design was much more accident
prone than other contemporary U.S. types.
It has been pointed out that 40.58% of the reviewed
German F-104 accidents occurred due to engine failures
(i.e., 24.64% solely for technical reasons, 15.94% after a
bird strike; Table 10). This raises the question as to
whether the F-104’s J-79 engine should be regarded as
unreliable and/or susceptible.
While the number of engine-related German F-104
accidents is surprising, the USAF F-104 accidents indicate
the same trend (Table 2). To this date the F-104 ranks again
by far on top of the list of USAF engine-related accidents—
outranking each competitor by a factor of two or more.
Moreover, the USAF F-104’s engine-related accident rate
of 9.48 accidents means it crashed twice as often as the
USAF average for engine issues alone.
When recognizing the USAF F-104’s total accident rate
of 30.36 accidents per 100,000 flight hours, it is striking
that for both German and U.S. F-104s about a third of their
accidents occurred due to engine failures.
Thus, it is reasonable to regard the J-79 engine as a weak
link in the F-104’s safety record.
It was expected that in contrast to public belief, the
German F-104s crashed for no other reasons different from
those for contemporary fighters. Three unexpected results
have already been addressed, indicating an underrepresen-
tation of human factor causations.
The fourth unexpected result is the rejection of H10 to
H50. In all cases the alternate hypothesis had to be favored.
This means: not only did the German F-104s crash for
different reasons from those for other aircraft, it also means
that if human factor causations were involved, those also
showed a significantly different distribution in relation to
the USAF control group.
There is no simple explanation for the different distri-
bution in the HFACS coding (Table 6). The results show
significantly fewer Decision Errors (i.e., 35.3% versus
44%), significantly fewer Perceptual Errors (i.e., 17.7%
versus 33%), and significantly fewer Violations (i.e., 5.9%
versus 8%). This may be an indicator for well trained and
disciplined pilots, but it appears impossible to pinpoint the
exact causation. After all, it was expected that the relative
distribution was no other than in the control group.
On the other hand, the results show significantly more
Skill-Based Errors than in the control group (i.e., 73.5%
versus 60%). This result supports Rall’s (2004) and
Vogler’s (1986) judgment of a complex design, which
took lots of practice to master and which permitted only
small error margins.
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Unfortunately, the large number of accidents without
unsafe acts led to a sample size reduction. This implied that
two out of three assumptions for the chi-square indepen-
dence test could not be fulfilled. The lack of randomization
is inherent to a quasi-experimental design and was meant to
be overcome by a large sample size. This was denied by the
sample size reduction. Additionally, it implied that the third
assumption (i.e., no less than 20% of expected frequencies
should be below 5) could not be fulfilled either. Therefore,
the results of the independence test will be regarded as chi-
square suspect, and hence H6 must remain undetermined.
Although it very likely exists, there is presently no suffi-
cient evidence for any correlation between flying hours on
type and error type.
Moreover, the accident investigations’ quality and
thoroughness surprised and impressed the author. On
average the accident files contained 250 pages, 534 pages
being the maximum. During this research, even earlier F-
104 accidents from the 1960s were reviewed and showed
the same thoroughness. Even the oldest reports showed
professionalism of the highest standards and a stunning
attention to detail. The final reports’ intonations were
generally fair and usually free of pilot blaming. Besides,
not a single case of alcohol or substance abuse was found.
Another issue which became evident when reviewing the
files was the excessive time span from identifying a
problem to fixing it. The following is but one of many
examples. The official report of GenFlSichhBw on the
second F-104 accident in September 1961 recommended
the development and installation of a flight data recorder.
It took until 1974 until the LEADS 200 device (Leigh
Electronic Airborne Data System) was installed into the
first F-104s (BMVg, 1985; GenFlSichhBw, 1961). Until
the end of its service life only 50 F-104s were equipped
with the LEADS 200 device, and in those aircraft the
LEADS 200 was deactivated repeatedly due to malfunc-
tions (Das Flugdatenregistriersystem, n.d.).
Conclusion
Approximately 15–20% of the German F-104 accidents
can be called ‘‘the price of doing business’’ with such an
aircraft in the European environment. This includes the
operation of a very demanding single-seat, single-engine
turbojet fighter close to the ground—and in a bird-rich
environment. Still, both German and U.S. F-104s had
significantly elevated accident rates in comparison to other
co-era types. The number of technical causations was
grossly overrepresented in German F-104 accidents, while
the number of human factor causations was underrepre-
sented. Moreover, the engine was found to be a weak part
in the design, which holds a negative record in the USAF
even to this date.
Hence, it can be concluded that the F-104 did crash
for different reasons from those for other military aircraft,
and it also crashed for other human factor reasons. Overall,
the Starfighter was more accident-prone than its co-era
types.
Abbreviation English term German term
AOA Angle of attack
BMVg German Ministry of Defense Bundesministerium der Verteidigung
GenFlSichhBw Directorate of Aviation Safety, Federal Armed Forces General Flugsicherheit der Bundeswehr
CRM Crew resource management
HFACS Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
LEADS 200 Leigh Electronic Airborne Data System 200
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NOTECHS Non-technical skills
MOD Ministry of Defense
USAF United States Air Force
WTD Military Flight Test Installation Wehrtechnische Dienststelle
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